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ABSTRACT  
Increasingly, new hardware and software are embedded within ecosystems that include a 
platform and modules. Ideally these ecosystems perform reliably. However, if an ambiguously 
sourced failure occurs within one of these ecosystems, users are left to distribute blame across 
the various components of the ecosystem. The actual distribution of this blame, however, can be 
difficult to predict. This study investigates attribution of blame and discontinuance 
recommendations for ecosystem components after an ambiguously sourced failure. To extend 
platform ecosystems and attribution theory, we conducted a scenario-based experiment 
investigating the negative consequences of failure for platform and module components and the 
contingent effects from design elements (border strength) and contextual factors (task goal-
directedness, disruption severity). Results demonstrated a diffusion of negative consequences for 
failure across ecosystem components, but ecosystem modules (apps) received the majority of the 
blame and highest discontinuance recommendations. High border strength shifted negative 
consequences for failure away from the OS to the device. Low goal-directedness resulted in 
users taking more of the blame for the failure, and higher disruption severity resulted in higher 
discontinuance recommendations for the OS and device. Importantly, the amount of blame 
attributed to one component in an ecosystem predicted discontinuance recommendations for 
other components.  
 
Manuscript Word Count: 10,067 
KEYWORDS 
mobile platforms, digital platforms, mobile platform ecosystems, failure, ambiguous failure, 




Blame Attribution after Failures within Platform Ecosystems  
 
INTRODUCTION 
As platform-based ecosystems become increasingly common, owners of components of 
those ecosystems are finding it important to understand how to manage their products within 
these ecosystems successfully. Given the interdependency among components, the function of 
any one component can be tied to the success and proper functioning of other components. 
Similarly, and central to our study, failure on the part of one component may affect end-user 
perceptions of other components. With this complex set of relationships and related risk in mind, 
these ecosystems present a major challenge for a component’s sponsor to influence how the 
sponsor is perceived.  
Although the nature and consequences of failures vary, previous research suggests that 
when a system fails, users search for someone or something to hold accountable for their 
frustration and any related negative consequences [56]. When users have a clear idea regarding 
responsibility for failure, this accountability is relatively straightforward to assess. However, 
within a platform ecosystem, where interdependence is the norm and responsibility among 
platform components may be unclear, understanding which component to hold accountable and 
to what degree becomes more complicated as the source of failure may be ambiguous and/or 
undiscernible by end users.  
For example, consider a motorist using the Waze app running on the Android OS on an 
HTC smartphone to navigate the streets in a foreign city. At a crucial intersection, the operation 
of the system stops entirely, leaving the motorist confused as to where to go, or, worse, in a 
dangerous traffic situation. Which component of the ecosystem does the motorist hold 
accountable and consider discontinue using? Similarly, a user interacting with the Hulu 




be available cannot be found). Again, which component of the ecosystem is held accountable and 
how does that affect the user’s perception and continued use of that component? 
In such situations, it is possible that multiple components are considered similarly 
culpable, multiple components are considered culpable by the user but in unequal amounts, or a 
single component could be considered the primary source of the problem. Within a complex 
enivornment, however, this assessment may or may not correspond with actual culpability. Thus, 
when platform ecosystem failures of an ambiguous nature occur, negative assessment assigned 
for the failure may spread over ecosystem components regardless of whether or not they are 
actually at fault.  
In this study, we address two broad research issues. First, we examine how users 
distribute blame among platform ecosystem components when they encounter a failure from an 
ambiguous source. Second, we consider how components within such ecosystems may be able to 
reduce the negative implications of such failures. In doing this, we use concepts from the 
platform ecosystems and platform markets literature [17, 57] to help understand the tight 
coupling within a platform ecosystem. We then integrate the concepts of digital borders and 
border strength [14] with attribution theory [20] to theorize the manner in which users choose to 
apportion blame after the occurrence of an ambiguous failure. 
Using the context of the smartphone platform, we conducted a scenario-based experiment 
in which we focused on how border strength, or the extent to which the boundaries around 
objects (in this case, the device, its OS, and an application), affects user blame attribution and 
discontinuance recommendations given an ambiguous failure. We also tested the effects of 
different types of task (goal-directed vs. less goal-directed) being conducted when the failure 




consequences for failure are shared across components, apps receive the majority of the blame 
and the highest discontinuance recommendation. Increasing the border strength between 
platform components, we found, shifted blame away from the OS and toward the device. 
Importantly, the amount of blame attributed to one component in an ecosystem predicted 
discontinuance recommendation for other components.  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Failure and Attribution 
While the complexity inherent in a platform ecosystem can create coordination and 
governance challenges [e.g., 28, 51], users still expect technology systems to function properly 
[56]. The context discussed here, of consumer-facing product-based ecosystems, aligns strongly 
with the concept of product failures. In simple (non-ecosystem) products, these failures have 
been found to result in negative consequences for the party deemed responsible, including 
refund-seeking [20], negative brand evaluation [51], distrust toward related products [10], and 
brand sabotage [29]. Therefore, understanding how the user identifies and attributes blame 
within a complex ecosystem, where the source of the failure may be particularly unclear, is vital 
to understanding how ecosystem failures affect user perceptions of the platform components’ 
sponsors. 
According to attribution theory, identifying the party to be held responsible occurs based 
on the user’s perception of situations and events [18]. In other words, an actor that purposefully 
exerted effort resulting in a negative outcome accrues more negative sentiment (e.g., blame) than 
one that was not capable of preventing the action from occurring. Therefore, for individuals to 




must be clear [50]. This intentionality has been further decomposed into attribution theory’s 
three key dimensions: locus, controllability, and stability. 
The locus of a failure captures the extent to which the action that caused the failure was 
internal or external to the individual making the assessment [60].  
Platform Ecosystems  
Platform ecosystems are systems that require both a core platform as well as modules 
built around the platform [58]. The platform supplies core functionality, such as access to input 
and output devices, data processing, and accesses to sensors. Modules, on the other hand, extend 
the functionality of the platform. Together, the platform and the modules that run on the platform 
form the platform ecosystem [57].  
Such platform ecosystems are becoming increasingly common. For example, consider the 
streaming video ecosystem where the hardware device (e.g., a Roku box or properly-equipped 
television) is the platform through which modules, in this case streaming service applications 
(e.g., Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, YouTube), provide access to content. Video game consoles 
provide another example, wherein the devices (e.g., the PlayStation or Xbox console) are the 
platform through which game modules provide content and interactivity. As another example, 
smartphones and mobile devices form a platform ecosystem, whereby the handset and operating 
system together form the platform upon which applications (the modules) extend the 
functionality.  
This form of ecosystem is attractive to both module creators and end users in that it 
facilitates easier adoption. For instance, a video game studio does not have to produce the system 
itself, input/output devices, or other protocols, but instead can focus on developing the 




devices or learn multiple interfaces to receive the benefits of differing applications. 
Platform ecosystems can vary in complexity. In some cases, software alone can be 
considered to comprise the platform. For instance, Microsoft Word facilitates access to many 
different plug-ins (modules), while an internet browser can be considered the platform that 
provides access to numerous website modules. However, platforms can also be considerably 
more complex and consist of a combination of both hardware and software [57]. In such cases, 
the software component of the platform runs on top of the hardware, forming a sort of “stack” 
that together comprises the full platform. This more-complex form of ecosystem is common in 
every day computing devices such as PCs (which require both the computer hardware as well as 
an operating system) and smart phones (which require both a handset as well as an operating 
system). 
With this added complexity, the necessary coordination and governance to facilitate 
proper function becomes more challenging [e.g., 28]. This may be particularly true for 
application developers who develop for a given operating system (e.g., developing apps for 
Android), but must also understand that there can be considerable variance with regard to the 
hardware part of the platform — for instance, the devices may have various screen sizes, 
memory capacity, and clock speeds. Further, in such complex platforms, both the software and 
hardware components of the platform must work together successfully, again while considering 
that the other components of the platform may vary (e.g., there are multiple versions of Android 
that may eventually appear on a handset and there are multiple different handsets that run 
Android). 
Such interaction and interdependence are a key characteristics of platform ecosystems 




failures to occur due to the interdependence among the components. Even if one component fails 
on its own, the performance of the other components is nevertheless tied to the failure of the one. 
To date, however, antecedents and consequences of user perceptions specific to the components 
in such ecosystems have not been widely considered despite the fact that qualities of a user’s 
experience have been shown to be crucial to the formation of user attitudes toward technology 
[e.g., 27, 37, 43].  
Failure and Attribution 
While the complexity inherent in a platform ecosystem can create challenges with 
coordination and governance, users still expect these ecosystems to function properly. When the 
system fails to perform to expectations, users will search for something to blame [56]. Various 
forms of failure have long been studied within the information systems field. Scholars define a 
system failure as any occurrence in which an information system fails to meet expectations or 
requirements [e.g., 19, 38, 56]. Using this definition, much research has addressed organization-
wide information systems that failed to satisfy their intended purpose to deliver value [3, 11, 15, 
47]. Causes of failure include project escalation [30, 31], organization-system fit [55], and user 
resistance [4, 23, 33]. While important as avenues of inquiry, these studies consider failure in a 
way different from that proposed in our research. In particular, these studies focus on 
organization-wide systems (vs. personal technology) and consider known sources of failure (vs. 
ambiguous sources). 
The failure of personal products used by individuals, however, has been studied at length 
in the marketing field, where it has been termed product failure. These failures have been found 
to result in negative consequences for the party responsible for the failure itself [5, 20, 39]. But 




entities (individuals, organizations) involved [50]. According to attribution theory, finding a 
given party to be responsible for a product failure — in other words, blaming a given party —
occurs based on the user’s perception of situations and events [18]. What the user perceives in 
terms of causality and responsibility for failure influences the user’s attribution of blame [50]. 
The party to whom blame is attributed has been found to suffer negative consequences as a 
result, such as anger and refund-seeking [20], negative brand evaluation [51], distrust toward 
related products [10], and brand sabotage [29].   
Early theory on attribution focused on ordinary individuals understanding the meaning 
behind the actions of others [22]. For individuals to make meaningful attributions about others’ 
dispositions based on observable actions, intentionality behind the actions must be clear [50]. In 
other words, one who purposefully exerted effort resulting in harmful actions would accrue more 
blame than one who was forced to perform harmful actions or unable to prevent harmful actions. 
In subsequent research, intentionality necessary to attribute blame was further decomposed into 
three characteristics: locus, controllability, and stability dimensions [60, 61]. 
In interpersonal attribution research, the locus of a failure captures whether the action that 
caused failure was internal or external to the individual [60]. When considering product failures, 
the locus has been conceptualized as an evaluation of direct culpability when a product fails to 
provide its intended function and is estimated on a continuum between the product and the 
consumer [20, 49]. When locus for a failure is estimated to be near the product, consumers 
perceive that the product is directly responsible and therefore subject to more blame. For 
example, failure experienced while using a product outside of its intended purpose (e.g., the car 
stops running after the user continued driving despite seeing the gas gauge on empty) may result 




attributed to the product would be much higher for failure experienced during appropriate 
product use (e.g., the car stops running despite normal maintenance and use). 
The controllability dimension captures the degree to which failure was the result of 
volitional or non-volitional action and is also traditionally conceptualized along a continuum 
[20]. Controllability indicates the degree to which an entity has the capacity to carry out an 
intended action. When controllability in product failure is high, individuals are likely to perceive 
that the negative consequences of the failure could have been avoided. Therefore, blame for the 
failure is also likely to be high. Alternatively, failure caused by unanticipated factors or lack of 
ability may not accrue as much blame because there was little control over the nature of the 
failure [60]. Although controllability often coincides with an internal locus, these dimensions can 
differentially affect blame. For example, a product manufacturer may contractually control the 
actions of a partner and therefore receive more blame for the partner’s actions in a failure even 
though the partner is external. The extent to which a party is perceived to have had control over a 
failure outcome is a key determinant of the product user’s adverse reaction [20]. 
Finally, the stability dimension is the degree to which the cause of the failure is 
temporary (e.g., could fluctuate over time) or permanent (e.g., is relatively stable) [20]. 
Perceptions of stability provide individuals making attributions in response to failure an estimate 
of how expected the failure was and how likely it will be in the future. For example, in the 
course of making attributions, one might consider: Is the failure the result of repeated action that 
is likely to continue or is it the result of transitory actions unlikely in the future? When the causes 
for failure are relatively stable, blame attributions tend to be more severe. 
Together, locus, controllability, and stability have successfully explained a host of 




applying attributions within platform ecosystems, where components are interdependent, 
presents a new challenge. The stability of each component within the ecosystem will likely 
remain observable. For example, users will notice repeated failures involving the ecosystem 
components. However, controllability and locus will likely be much more difficult to assess and 
may be more fluid. For example, in ecosystems with multiple components, the locus can be 
shared among the components (and the user). Additionally, the resources over which each 
component has control in the ecosystem are often unclear and consumers might have difficulty 
determining if a failure was avoidable. Given the interdependence in a platform ecosystem, this 
fault ambiguity would be highly likely any time a failure occurs — even error messages 
purporting to explain the failure may miss the mark or mislead the user, who has few resources 
available (and likely lacks the time, patience, and necessity) to research root causes of 
ambiguous failures. 
HYPOTHESES AND MODEL 
To explore ambiguously sourced failures in mobile platform ecosystems, we first 
consider how locus, controllability, and stability can be used to attribute blame to ecosystem 
components and ultimately affect discontinuance recommendations. We then introduce a new 
characteristic, border strength, which we argue can alter the locus and controllability and thereby 
affect blame attribution and discontinuance recommendations. Finally, we explore contextual 
contingencies of disruption severity and goal-directedness and how they can influence blame and 
discontinuance.  
Platform Ecosystem Components 
To understand how components within a platform ecosystem may be perceived 




Specifically, we draw a distinction between platforms (e.g., the device and OS working together) 
and modules (e.g., apps) in the ecosystem. When individuals experience failure within a platform 
ecosystem, they may not be aware of technical reason for the failure, thus possibly obscuring 
actual locus and controllability. However, users are aware of their actions as they interact with 
ecosystem components and these actions make apps the most likely target for blame attribution 
and recommended discontinuance should a failure occur. Any ambiguously sourced failure will 
occur during operation of an app, and, prior to that failure, users will have deliberately opened 
and used the app. Therefore, the app and its potential role in the failure would be highly salient 
and locus for the failure would likely be closer to the app. Further, the operating environment of 
the platform is likely to be common and accessible to all developers who create apps. Therefore, 
app developers will be attributed a greater degree of control over the unique experience their 
apps provide. If failure occurs, users will likely contrast the failure with successful operation of 
other apps in the same ecosystem (which ostensibly had similar control). Since platform 
components provide similar resources to all apps, the increased locus and controllability for the 
app would lead to higher blame attributed to app than to other components in the ecosystem 
stack.   
Finally, the purpose of platform components is to create a stable operating environment 
that facilitates access to and management of the digital resources available in the platform [57]. 
In comparison to experience with apps, users likely will have had many more interactions with 
platform components during which failure did not occur. In fact, one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of platforms and an important reason why developers create apps for the platform 
is stability [57]. With modules of the ecosystem being ascribed greater locus and controllability 




discontinuance in response to ambiguous system failures. Therefore,   
H1: Mobile platform modules (i.e., apps) will be attributed (a) greater blame and 
(b) higher discontinuance recommendation after an ambiguously sourced system 
failure than platform components (i.e., device, OS). 
 
Border Strength 
To consider how attributions of blame and discontinuance recommendations may be 
altered by organizations supporting ecosystem components, we draw on the concept of the digital 
border. A digital border is the specific boundary around a digital artifact such as a website or an 
application [14]. The prominence of a digital border has predicted recognition of websites, with 
consequences resulting from recognition (or non-recognition). These findings have particular 
salience for branding on the Web; websites with higher borders are more likely recognized and 
credited for their contributions to a task, potentially leading to greater user loyalty and brand 
recognition. In the Web context, border recognition and attribution can be influenced by border 
strength, or the extent to which a virtual location is indicated and reinforced (e.g., through 
notifications, visual cues, or instructions) [14].  
Given the findings regarding the effects of border strength in the Web context, we expect 
that border strength will exhibit a similar effect within more complex mobile platform 
ecosystems by making the potential locus of the failure more evident and raising awareness of 
potential sources of controllability. Each component within a platform ecosystem, whether part 
of the platform or module, has opportunity to better differentiate itself and, thus, strengthen the 
border between itself and the remainder of the ecosystem. These borders, for instance, might be 
strengthened through stronger, better-differentiated, and potentially interrupting design choices. 
An application, for instance, can include a branded “splash screen” to raise the user’s awareness 




through design choices, the OS and device may raise greater awareness of themselves. Such 
designs have been found to strengthen borders within a multi-site Internet session context [14], 
and we expect that stronger borders will play a similar role within the mobile platform 
ecosystem. Strengthening of borders in this way will make apparent and distinguish the multiple 
components that could appear monolithic to users. Increasing the prominence of ecosystem 
components that could potentially be at fault should an failure occur will facilitate the generation 
and direct perceptions of locus and controllability. For example, increasing border strength will 
increase salience of the boundaries of controllability for each component. Strengthened borders 
will also make more clear which components are in operation at the time of failure and, thus, will 
likely alter perceptions of locus. Therefore,  
H2: The border strength separating components within the mobile platform 
ecosystem will significantly affect (a) the amount of blame assessed the 
component and (b) the discontinuance recommendation of the component after an 
ambiguously sourced system failure. 
 
Goal-Directedness 
Among contextual factors, the objective of the task being performed by a user interacting 
with an ecosystem is critical to consider. A user may perceive the components differently 
depending on the user’s specific activity: finding an answer to a closed-ended question, 
researching a topic of interest to form an opinion, or passing time in pursuit of hedonic interests. 
The range of potential activities that can be performed within a digital environment has been 
described by several typologies. These include hedonic vs. instrumental/utilitarian [e.g., 9, 34, 
37, 59], telic vs. paratelic [12], hedonic vs. intrinsic vs. extrinsic system proposed by Lowry et 





In this work, we conceptualize task using a binary categorization of experiential vs. goal-
directed [e.g., 25, 42, 44, 62]. This conceptualization is among the most commonly used and 
permits exploration of task performance failure in some degree of structure. Further, the 
conceptualization captures the greatest dichotomy among potential task types that are widely 
performed using mobile platform ecosystems. Past research using this dichotomy has shown not 
only its usefulness, but also its effects on user perceptions and intentions related to information 
systems. Deng and Poole [12] found varying levels of pleasantness were perceived due to 
interactions between a user’s meta-motivational state and the goal-directedness of a task. 
Nadkarni and Gupta [42] found that goal-directedness affected user satisfaction with an online 
system when considered along with the system’s visual complexity. Finally, Novak et al. [44] 
found that goal-directedness affected the amount of flow (immersion in an activity) experienced 
by Web users.  
In a similar vein, we anticipate that goal-directedness of a task will also alter the blame 
and discontinuance recommendations for ecosystem components after an ambiguously sourced 
failure. Blame occurs in response to actions for which individuals will suffer negative 
consequences [50]. In contrast to experiential tasks, when failure occurs during goal-directed 
tasks users are denied achieving a defined their aims and must suffer anticipated consequences. 
Therefore, when goal-directedness is high, blame attributions based on locus, controllability, and 
stability are likely to be stronger. For example, in a focused task with a concrete objective, users 
will be more likely to take note of obstacles and who placed them (i.e., locus, controllability) that 
prevent them from reaching their objectives. If failure within a platform ecosystem makes goal 
achievement impossible, users will likely respond negatively by attributing blame. In contrast, 




and be more likely to simply move on to other tasks. Therefore,  
H3: The goal-directedness of the interaction with a mobile platform ecosystem 
will significantly affect (a) the amount of blame assessed the component and (b) 
the recommended discontinuance of the component after an ambiguously sourced 
system failure. 
Disruption Severity 
Ecosystem failures can result in a variety of consequences for the user. For example, 
some failures may cost the user only a few moments of inconvenience, while others may require 
considerably more time and effort to resolve. Indeed, Galletta et al. [21] found that delay within 
a website context was a cost which negatively impacted a user’s future intentions. Other studies 
have yielded similar findings, where perceived and actual delays negatively impacted the quality 
of an experience [16, 54], increased user frustration [8, 48], and hampered system success [45]. 
As the negative consequences for failure increase we expect to see blame attributions as the 
result of locus, controllability, and reliability increase. These attributions should also be evident 
in discontinuance recommendations. Therefore,  
H4: The disruption severity caused by an ambiguously sourced system failure will 
(a) increase the amount of blame assessed to components of a mobile platform 
ecosystem and (b) increase the recommended discontinuance of components. 
Blame Attribution and Continuance 
Finally, within the context of a user’s interaction with information technology, we expect 
blame resulting from failure within a mobile platform ecosystem to have important 
consequences. Indeed, in the ecommerce context and as noted by Tan et al. [56], service failures 
result in negative consequences for the sites where the failures transpired. A substantial literature 
has found significant relationships between negative perceptions of a technology and future 
intentions with regard to that technology [e.g., 27, 37, 43]. We expect a similar relationship to 




H5: The greater the blame assessed a mobile platform ecosystem component after 
an ambiguously sourced system failure, the greater the recommended 
discontinuance of that component.  
 
Model 
As described above, our exploration consists of the evaluation of the model shown in 
Figure 1. We examined blame attribution to and discontinuance recommendations for the device, 






















Figure 1. Experimental model for blame and discontinuance  
METHOD 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted two scenario-based experiments within the mobile 
platform ecosystem. The first experiment (n = 142) confirmed how attributions are made after 
failures and explored effects of border strength on discontinuance recommendations for platform 
components (H1, H2). The second experiment (n = 367) revisited border strength and examined 
additional effects from goal-directedness and disruption severity on discontinuance (H1-H4). 
Four pilot studies, including over 500 participants, tested the scenarios and measurement prior to 
the main experiments. Data were collected in a single session for each participant via the 




condition and were asked to complete a pre-survey including control variables. They were then 
presented a multi-part scenario (customized by condition) in which they had been given a 
smartphone (device and OS) with an app that they were expected to use for a new job. While 
using the smartphone and app, a failure occurred which resulted in the temporary inoperability of 
the smartphone. After finishing the scenario and completing attention checks, participants then 
answered questions about components in the mobile platform ecosystem. Appendix A contains 
the items that were used in the experiments. Appendix B includes the full text and treatment 
conditions in the scenarios. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 checked manipulations, revealed attributions in response to failure, and 
examined the effects of border strength (weak border vs. strong border-unfamiliar app developer 
vs. strong border-familiar app developer) on discontinuance recommendations (H1, H2).  
Participants 
Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service, which 
has been found to provide participants similar in quality to other frequently-used sources, such as 
university students and commercial panel recruiting services [e.g., 6, 35, 53]. Participation was 
limited to United States residents who had completed more than 100 MTurk assignments, but 
fewer than 1,000 [46]. Participants were compensated $1.00 to complete the experiment. We 
sourced 200 participants, but 58 participants failed attention checks and comprehension tests. 
Therefore, our final sample included 142 participants. The mean age of participants was 33.8 
(SD = 10.7); 60.0% were female, and 59.1% completed at least a bachelor's degree. Every 
participant reported owning a smartphone and 96.5% of participants reported using their 





Border strength was manipulated in the beginning of the scenario. Participants were 
given some background about a job they had just started and the expectation of using a company-
assigned smartphone and app. As a robustness check for border strength, we tested both familiar 
and unfamiliar app developers. Teleduke is a fictitious company created for this experiment and 
Oracle is an established company that is widely known. In the strong borders conditions the 
brands of the device, OS, and app were named in the scenario, which read: 
Imagine you have started a job for a new company working in the service 
department. The company has given you a new smartphone that they expect you to 
use as your primary mobile device. This particular smartphone is made by 
Motorola and is the Moto E model. The phone uses the Android operating system 
developed by Google (version 4.4). Your company has also required you to install 
and use a third-party app called ComMentor from the Google Play store. This 
app allows you to monitor and collect data regarding customer comments and 
was developed by a company called [Teleduke (Unfamiliar app developer)/ 
Oracle (Familiar app developer)].  
The identity of these brands was then reinforced through attention-check questions, 
which asked participants to name the smartphone manufacturer, the operating system, and the 
name of the app developer (only responses where the participant correctly answered these 
questions were included in the analysis). In the weak borders condition, the background omitted 
brand names and was followed by questions asking participants to name the department where 
they worked, where the company’s headquarters was located, as well as the kind of building in 
which the job took place. 
Dependent and Control Variables 
Following the scenario, participants were given the following prompt: 
Your company is considering making changes to the smartphone, smartphone 
operating system, and the app that you used in the scenario. This change would 
affect you and all other employees in your department. Each of these components 
could be changed separately (i.e., the company could change smartphone devices, 




Following this prompt, participants were asked to recommend whether the company should 
change the device, the OS, and the app. This recommendation was on a seven-point scale, 
ranging from strongly recommend against (changing the component) to strongly recommend. 
Our investigation also considered several control variables that were included based on 
past literature indicating that they may affect user attribution of failure with an ambiguous source 
as well as discontinuance recommendation. Since we used actual brands, we captured attitudes 
about those brands. Prior to starting the scenario, participants provided their impressions of the 
smartphone manufacturer, OS, and app brands that would be referenced in the scenario to come. 
Impressions were captured on a seven-point scale ranging from very negative to very positive 
[e.g., 13]. The four scenario brands were randomly mixed with eight additional brands to 
ameliorate priming effects for the scenario brands. Participants then completed scales for 
propensity to blame, mobile device self-efficacy [1, 41], product involvement [63], and 
normative and informational susceptibility to interpersonal influence (SII) [2].  
Results 
To check the theoretical rationale for how borders function to alter attributions following 
ambiguous failure, we first examined perceptions of locus, controllability, and stability (see 
Table 1).1 In the rationale for H1, we argued that perceptions of stability would differ between 
modules (i.e., app) and the platform (e.g., OS, device). Consistent with this argument, within-
subjects comparisons from a repeated analysis of variance (ANOVA) demonstrated differences 
in the level of stability attributed to the app, OS, and device, F(2, 280) = 4.126, p = .017. 
Furthermore, in the rationale for H2, we argued that making borders salient within the platform 
                                                 
1 Prior to reporting discontinuance recommendations, participants rated the app, OS, and device using the following 
items taken from <<CITE>>. “The following questions concern the [app, OS, device]. The problem you read about 
above is something…” Locus: “That reflects an aspect about the [app, OS, device]” … “That reflects something 
about the situation”; Controllability: “That the [app, OS, device] can regulate” … “That the [app, OS, device] cannot 




ecosystem would alter locus and controllability. Consistent with this argument, between-subjects 
comparisons from a repeated ANOVA demonstrated that border strength significantly affected 
locus, F(2, 139) = 4.304, p = .015. However, border strength did not affect controllability, F(2, 





Attributions Device Mean (SD) OS Mean (SD) App Mean (SD) 
Weak Border Stability 4.93 (1.52) 4.63 (1.43) 5.24 (1.37) 
Locus 3.90 (1.84) 3.71 (1.42) 2.71 (1.42) 
Controllability 3.98 (1.59) 3.22 (1.28) 3.17 (1.55) 
Strong Border – 
Teleduke 
Stability 4.69 (1.49) 4.78 (1.45) 5.24 (1.24) 
Locus 4.73 (1.62) 4.58 (1.64) 2.75 (1.60) 
Controllability 4.49 (1.67) 4.00 (1.82) 2.84 (1.63) 
Strong Border – 
Oracle 
Stability 5.15 (1.33) 4.80 (1.52) 4.98 (1.42) 
Locus 4.93 (1.61) 3.89 (1.72) 2.76 (1.61) 
Controllability 4.33 (1.78) 3.74 (1.72) 3.13 (1.71) 
Table 1. Experiment 1 stability, locus, and controllability mean values. 
Following checks of attribution, we then examined our hypotheses by testing effects of 
borders on discontinuance. Means of discontinuance recommendations are shown in Table 2. To 
test H1, we performed a repeated ANOVA to compare the discontinuance recommendations for 
the app, OS, and device. The repeated ANOVA accounted for the nonindependence of 
observations and demonstrated significant differences between ecosystem components, F(2, 278) 
= 38.342, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.22. In support of H1, post-hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction for 
repeated tests demonstrated that discontinuance recommendations were higher for the app than 
they were for the OS and device (both at p < .001).  









Borders Weak Border 46 3.89 (1.55) 4.41 (1.57) 5.76 (1.10) 
Strong Border – 
Teleduke 
55 4.65 (1.61) 4.69 (1.67) 5.84 (1.21) 
Strong Border – 
Oracle 




Total 143 4.38 (1.59) 4.74 (1.57) 5.72 (1.13) 
Table 2. Experiment 1 discontinuance recommendation model mean values. 
To test H2, we performed a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with 
border strength as the independent variable, discontinuance recommendations for each 
component as dependent variables, and control variables as covariates. Since discontinuance 
recommendations among ecosystem components are conceptually related, MANCOVAs are 
appropriate analysis techniques [40]. The complete results from the MANCOVA are presented in 
Appendix C. Multivariate tests, F(6, 258) = 2.083, p = .056, indicated a significant effect for 
border strength. Consistent with H2, follow up univariate tests demonstrated significant effects 
from borders on continuance recommendations for the OS, F(2, 130) = 4.027, p = .020, ηp2 = 
0.06, and for the device, F(2, 130) = 3.127, p = .047, ηp2 = 0.05. Post hoc tests with a Bonferroni 
correction revealed that strong borders resulted in higher discontinuance recommendations the 
OS (Strong Border-Oracle compared with Weak Boarder: p = .014) and device (strong border-
teleduke compared with weak boarder: p = .057).  
Several covariates demonstrated a significant influence on the dependent variables; 
therefore, abbreviated significant results are reported next. Brand impressions of the device (p = 
.017) and the app developer (Teleduke: p = .008) influenced discontinuance of the app. 
Propensity to blame (p = .021), product involvement (p = .036), and SII (normative) (p = .044) 
influenced discontinuance of the OS. Full results are reported in Appendix C.   
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 expanded on Experiment 1 and tested H1 – H4 and followed a 3 (border 
strength: weak border vs. strong border-teleduke vs. strong border-oracle) × 2 (goal-directedness: 





Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service. We 
sourced 480 participants via MTurk with the same restrictions and incentive as in Experiment 1. 
Removing participants who did not complete the experiment and those who failed these attention 
checks resulted in n = 367, with 29 or more participants in each cell. The mean age of 
participants was 33.2 (SD = 8.8), 61.3% were female, and 52.4% completed at least a bachelor's 
degree. Every participant reported owning a smartphone and 94.0% of participants reported 
using their smartphones several times each day.  
Independent Variables 
In Experiment 2, border strength was manipulated in the same manner as in Experiment 1 
and participants who failed to correctly identify the app developer, OS developer, or device 
manufacturer were excluded. Following border strength, goal-directedness was manipulated and 
included two conditions: goal-directed or experiential [42, 44]. In the goal-directed condition, the 
scenario continued by describing a circumstance in which the participant was asked to use the 
smartphone and app to complete a goal-directed task (finding examples of an employee’s work 
as part of an award nomination process as in Experiment 1). In the experiential condition, the 
scenario continued by describing a circumstance in which the participant looked for entertaining 
exchanges between customers and support employees. Participants in the goal-directed condition 
reported that in the scenario they had more of a distinct, identifiable purpose (M = 6.27, SD = 
.91; t(362) = 15.20, p < 0.001) and looked up more specific information (M = 6.31, SD = .96; 
t(365) = 16.15, p < 0.001) than participants in the experiential condition (purpose M = 4.24, SD = 
1.56; specific information M = 4.03, SD = 1.65).2 These significant differences indicated a 
successful manipulation for goal-directedness.  
                                                 
2Manipulation check items for goal-directedness and disruption severity were measured on a 7-point Likert type 




Lastly, participants were also assigned to either a low or high disruption severity 
condition. In both conditions, the scenario described an ambiguous failure in the mobile platform 
ecosystem during which the app, OS, and device froze and became unresponsive during the task. 
In the low disruption severity condition, participants were told that after freezing, they restarted 
the smartphone and it became operable again. In the high disruption severity condition, however, 
participants were told: 
You cannot get the phone to turn off and restart. After taking the phone to your 
company’s IT group, it takes three days to get your phone back in working order, 
during which time you miss several important calls from your boss, who is out of 
the country. 
Indicating a successful manipulation, participants in the high disruption severity 
condition reported their disruption as more severe (M = 5.75, SD = 1.15; t(365) = 13.15, p < 
0.001) and serious (M = 5.88, SD = 1.18; t(365) = 13.00, p < 0.001) than participants in the low 
disruption condition (severe M = 3.82, SD = 1.61; serious M = 3.95, SD = 1.63). 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables and control variables in Experiment 2 mirrored those from 
Experiment 1 and included continuance recommendations as the dependent variable and attitudes 
about the smartphone manufacturer, OS, and app brands, propensity to blame, mobile device 
self-efficacy [1, 41], product involvement [63], and normative and informational SII [2] 
comprised the control variables.  
Analysis 
The analysis approach for Experiment 2 mirror the approach for Experiment 1. 
Descriptive statistics discontinuance recommendations are shown in Table 3. 












Borders Weak Border 123 4.04 (1.339) 4.48 (1.276) 5.59 (1.145) 
Strong Border 
– Teleduke 
123 4.64 (1.466) 4.07 (1.524) 5.60 (1.122) 
Strong Border 
– Oracle 
121 4.53 (1.461) 4.28 (1.629) 5.49 (1.239) 
Goal-
Directedness 
Experiential 184 4.33 (1.340) 4.36 (1.434) 5.56 (1.172) 
Goal-Directed 183 4.48 (1.540) 4.19 (1.541) 5.56 (1.165) 
Disruption 
Severity 
Low  182 4.30 (1.411) 4.18 (1.462) 5.34 (1.289) 
High  185 4.50 (1.471) 4.37 (1.513) 5.77 (.990) 
Total 367 4.40 (1.443) 4.28 (1.489) 5.56 (1.167) 
Table 3. Experiment 2 discontinuance recommendation model mean values. 
To test H1, we conducted a repeated ANOVA comparing the discontinuance 
recommendations among the three components (device, OS, and app). Results demonstrated that, 
like in Experiment 1, discontinuance recommendations in Experiment 2 also differed across 
components, F(2, 365) = 113.469, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.38. Post-hoc tests with a Bonferroni 
correction indicated that discontinuance recommendations for device and OS did not differ from 
each other (p = .480). However, as shown by the total means in Table 2, discontinuance 
recommendations for the app were higher than recommendations for the device (p < .001) and 
for the OS (p < .001). These findings replicate support for H1.  
To test H2, H3, and H4, a MANCOVA was performed using border strength, goal-
directedness, and disruption severity as independent variables, discontinuance recommendations 
for the device, OS, and app as the dependent variables, and control variables as covariates. The 
complete results from the both MANCOVAs are presented in Appendix C.  
Multivariate tests indicated significant main effects for border strength, F(6, 690) = 
3.745, p = .001, and for disruption severity, F(3, 344) = 3.897, p = .009. The lack of significant 
effects from goal-directedness failed to support H3. Univariate tests indicated a significant main 
effect of border strength on recommended discontinuance for the manufacturer, F(2, 346) = 
4.264, p = .015, ηp2 = 0.02, and for the OS, F(2, 346) = 3.770, p = .024, ηp2 = 0.02. These 




severity on discontinuance recommendations for the app, F(1, 346) = 10.537, p = .001, ηp2 = 
0.03. Post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction revealed that those in the weak border condition 
reported lower manufacturer discontinuance recommendations than those in both strong border 
conditions (Oracle: p = .054; Teleduke: p = .023). But, those in the strong border Teleduke 
condition reported lower OS discontinuance recommendations than those in the low border 
condition (p = .019). Finally, consistent with H4, those in the severe disruption condition 
reported higher discontinuance recommendations for the app (p = .001).  
Abbreviated significance tests are reported for significant covariates. Higher impressions 
of Android decreased the discontinuance recommendations for the OS (p = .001). SII 
(informational) increased the discontinuance recommendations for manufacturer (p = .036) and 
OS (p = .011). Full results are reported in Appendix C.  
DISCUSSION 
The objective of this paper was to explore the attribution of responsibility after an 
ambiguous failure in a platform ecosystem as well as understand the consequences from such 
attributions. The results (see Table <<REF>>) provide several important theoretical and practical 
advances regarding attribution and discontinuance recommendations. We discuss each below. 




H1: Mobile platform modules (i.e., apps) will be attributed 
higher discontinuance recommendation after an ambiguously 
sourced system failure than platform components (i.e., 
device, OS). 
Supported Supported 
H2: The border strength separating components within the 
mobile platform ecosystem will significantly affect the 
discontinuance recommendation of the component after an 
ambiguously sourced system failure. 
Supported Supported 
H3: The goal-directedness of the interaction with a mobile 
platform ecosystem will significantly affect the recommended 
discontinuance of the component after an ambiguously 
sourced system failure. 
- Not Supported 
H4: The disruption severity caused by an ambiguously 





discontinuance of components. 
 
Contributions to Theory 
 First among the contributions of this paper is the formalization of ambiguous failures in 
platform ecosystems. Although previous research has explored consequences related to IT 
systems failure [e.g., 26, 56], none to our knowledge has explored the effects of failure in 
platforms where the source of the failure is unclear. Platforms and modules are designed to 
integrate seamlessly, but it is critical to understand the consequences should integration fail. 
Platform ecosystems are becoming increasingly prevalent for both consumers and organizations 
[57] . More and more, companies must compete within the context of their platform membership 
[58]. With the interconnectedness of components within such an ecosystem, responsibility for 
ecosystem function is distributed across multiple components, including both platform 
components and modules. Prior work [24] has treated in isolation perceptions of the form and 
function of various components in digital ecosystems. Our study provides evidence that a focus 
on a single ecosystem component may neglect critical aspects regarding how consumers actually 
use and experience mobile platform ecosystems.  
Second, with the prevalence of mobile platform ecosystems and their attempts at tight 
integration, ambiguous failure of one or more components of the ecosystem is likely to be a 
recurring issue. When failures arise, how do users attribute responsibility? Both Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2 demonstrated that when ecosystem failure occurs, the app was recommended 
much more strongly than other platform components for discontinuance. Yet, this finding was 
also was intriguing because the app was also attributed much less locus and controllability than 
the OS or device (see Table 1). According to attribution theory, greater locus and controllability 




ambiguous failure within platform ecosystems. Instead, the last dimension of attribution theory 
offers clues to how responsibility is assigned to the app. Users perceived the app as less stable 
than other components in the ecosystem and on this basis, were more likely to assign greater 
responsibility for failure. The implications of this finding suggest that the three dimensions of 
attribution theory are not equally weighted when determining fault for ambiguous ecosystem 
failure. In this case, stability may be more important than locus or controllability.  
Although the app bears the brunt of negative consequences during ecosystem failure, we 
show that the OS and device are not absolved of culpability. Results suggest that following 
ambiguous failure, multiple parties share in the perceived responsibility. Across conditions, 
discontinuance recommendations were at or above the midpoint for all ecosystem components, 
implying that failure of the ecosystem, regardless of the component originating the failure, will 
have a negative impact on all components in the ecosystem. These findings suggest that digital 
ecosystems may often be at the mercy of the weakest component used by the consumer.   
Third, we find that design elements (e.g., borders) and contextual factors (e.g., disruption 
severity) are important contingencies in the attribution of responsibility for failure subsequent 
discontinuance recommendations. Although the app remained the most likely to be discontinued 
regardless of border condition, results of both experiments demonstrated that borders altered 
discontinuance recommendations for the digital platform itself (not ecosystem modules). In 
Experiment 1, salient borders increased discontinuance for the OS and device. Experiment 2 
replicated the findings for the device, but border salience was shown to decrease discontinuance 
for the OS. These findings support the idea that the digital platform (e.g., OS, device) is most 
susceptible to the effects of borders and that the device manufacturer faces greater negative 




are complex and warrant additional attention. Results regarding how attributions are made may 
offer clues to a potential explanation: Experiment 1 demonstrated that the effect of borders was 
most closely associated with locus (and not controllability). In other words, the effect of borders 
appears to operate more through estimates of direct culpability and less through estimates of the 
capacity and intention to avoid failure. Other researchers have argued that the OS is the central 
component of platform [57] and its boundaries may be obscured. Positioning of the locus in 
response to failure may be a more difficult (and ambiguous) task for the OS than for the other 
components in an ecosystem, but this speculation requires additional research.  
Among the two contextual factors we examined, effects from disruption severity were 
more pronounced. We uncovered no effects on discontinuance recommendations from goal-
directedness, which suggests individuals are likely to harbor similar attitudes about 
discontinuance regardless of the task they were performing at the time of failure. Consistent with 
our expectations, disruption severity increased discontinuance recommendations for the app, but 
the effect did not spread to the OS or device. This finding implies that, in addition to the 
tendency for the app to be most likely discontinued following failure, the consequences from 
severity of the disruption (as tested here) also fall disproportionately on the app.  
Implications for Practice 
Should ambiguous failure of a mobile platform ecosystem occur, blame is shared among 
all components of the ecosystem. A better integrated system that experiences fewer faults, 
therefore, benefits all members of the ecosystem. This finding supports a tighter integration 
among all components of the stack to create a more functionally problem-free system where 
good apps run confidently on an easy-to-develop-for OS that is then run on hardware devices 




it. In fact, some operating systems may already be taking pains to ensure this occurs, for instance 
Microsoft has reportedly created specific hooks within its Windows PC OS to facilitate 
successful interaction with certain software and hardware vendor products [52]. 
When ambiguous failures arise, app developers should be aware that their products are 
most likely to be held responsible and other components of the ecosystem (e.g., OS and device) 
are more insulated from responsibility. Apps are perceived as less stable compared to other 
components in the ecosystem and the worse the disruption, the greater the likelihood users will 
opt to discontinue using the app. Therefore, in the eyes of users, app developers are likely to bear 
the largest portion of responsibility for delivering a problem-free experience. As the level of 
attributed responsibility grows, so too will a disproportionate incentive for tight and robust 
integration between apps and platform components. Fortunately for app developers, the type of 
app or what users are doing with the app (experiential or goal-directed) seems to matter less than 
other failure contingencies.  
Finally, design decisions that make borders between ecosystem components salient alter 
discontinuance recommendations. Salient borders prior to failure will harm attitudes toward the 
device, but its effects are mixed toward the OS. Thus, device manufacturers and OS developers 
may be incentivized to obscure borders in situations where probability of failure is high. App 
developers, on the other hand, may be incentivized to promote borders to differentiate 
themselves from other app developers and other components in the ecosystem, but also to spread 
responsibility should failure occur. 
Limitations and Future Research 
There are some important limitations to our findings. First, we chose one of several 




to ground our scenarios in familiar contexts and have distinct differentiation between 
experimental conditions, other ecosystems and taxonomies could present different outcomes in 
response to failure. Therefore, replication with other ecosystems and task taxonomies is 
recommended. Additionally, while we found significant main effects for border strength, our 
manipulation was simplified as a result of the scenario-based data collection approach. Other, 
real-world attempts at creating border strength may have amplified effects on the results and 
should be a subject for future inquiry. Finally, our data collection was based entirely on a 
scenario-based experiment in which participants had to pretend to have participated in the events 
described to them. While we found significant results, we expect that these results were 
dampened by the requirement to imagine the experience. Future research may find even more 
pronounced results from an experimental or archival dataset based on actual failure experienced 
by participants. 
Conclusion 
Platform ecosystems continue to grow in prominence both for organizations and 
consumers. The markets created by these ecosystems also continue to grow, despite possible 
complications caused by an increased level of interconnectedness among components within 
these systems. Our study has made significant contributions to the understanding of such 
systems, particularly when ambiguous failures occur within them. Further, we have uncovered 
interesting results regarding the nature of user perceptions of components within mobile platform 
ecosystems in the context of a system failure. As such ecosystems proliferate, the relevance and 
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